Antiochus IV and the Three Horns in Daniel 7

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1. Introduction

The symbolism of the horns in Dan 7 is central to the visions of Jewish and Hellenistic history that form the core of the second half of the Book of Daniel. In the vision of ch. 7, Daniel sees three mighty beasts before he is shown a fourth beast that has ten horns.

While I was gazing upon these horns, a new little horn sprouted up among them; three of the older horns were uprooted to make room for it. . . . Then I wanted to ascertain the true meaning of the fourth beast . . . and of the ten horns on its head; and of the new one that sprouted, to make room for which three fell . . . “And the ten horns [mean]—from that kingdom, ten kings will arise, and after them another will arise. He will be different from the former ones, and will bring low three kings” (Dan 7:8, 19–20, 24).1

All modern scholars agree with Porphyry who, in the third century C.E., stated that the little, eleventh, horn is the Seleucid king Antiochus IV.2 Many take the cautious stance, however, that we cannot

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1 All translations are from NJPS unless indicated otherwise.
2 Many of Porphyry’s interpretations are reported by Jerome; see G. L. Archer, Jerome’s Commentary on Daniel (Eugene, Oreg.: Wipf and Stock, 2009). The consensus of scholarship is that the texts presented in Dan 7–12 were written during Antiochus IV’s persecution of the Jews in 167–64 and before his death in 164/163; cf., recently, D. E. Gowan, Daniel (Nashville: Abingdon, 2001), 20: “So Daniel can be dated more closely than any other biblical book, in 165 BC.” The consensus that the book is a vaticinium ex eventu consisting of texts written c. 165 B.C.E. as if they had been foretold in the sixth century has held steady for over a century since the work of S. R. Driver, The Book of Daniel (Cambridge: Cambridge at the University Press, 1900); see, e.g., B. S. Childs, Introduction to the Old Testament as Scripture (Philadelphia: SCM, 1979), 612. This view is likewise shared by conservative scholars, who believe that part or all of the materials preserved in Dan 7–12 may go back to the sixth century, rather than being vaticinia ex eventu. See, for example, J. G. Baldwin, Daniel: An Introduction and Commentary (The Tyndale Old Testament Commentaries;
know the names of all the kings represented by the ten horns, or that “ten” may simply be a conventional and schematic number for a set of generation. The identities of the last three horns, on the other hand, seem more attainable. Collins, for instance, states that, “The three horns that were uprooted by the little one are likely to have specific referents . . . since they are recent, having been overthrown by Antiochus Epiphanes, and the number is small.” In attempting to identify the three kings, Porphyry lists King Artaxias of Armenia, Ptolemy VI Philometor and Ptolemy VII Euergetes, all of whom Antiochus IV defeated (in 169, 168 and 166, respectively). Others suggest combinations of Seleucus IV and his two sons, Demetrius and Antiochus, his minister Heliodorus, and the Ptolemaic dynasts Ptolemy VI Philometor, Cleopatra II and Ptolemy VIII. The popular view in recent scholarship is that all ten

Downers Grove: Inter-Varsity Press, 1978), 183: “. . . the ruler in question is Antiochus Epiphanes, and in this there is no disagreement.”


6 See the review of different theories in Goldingay, Daniel, 180. I will mention a few examples. Bickerman states that the three are Ptolemy VI, Ptolemy VII and Cleopatra II (Bickerman, Four Strange Books, 104). Charles and Montgomery include Heliodorus as one of the last three, but Rowley dismisses this possibility (R. H. Charles, A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Book of Daniel [Oxford: Clarendon, 1929], 172; J. A. Montgomery, A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Book of Daniel [ICC; New York: Scribner’s, 1927], 293; H. H. Rowley, Darius the Mede and the Four World Empires in the Book of Daniel: A Historical Study of Contemporary Theories [Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 1964], 108–14). McNamara thinks that the three are “the two sons of Seleucus IV . . .” and Antiochus IV’s “own son who was co-regent with his father from 175 to 170 BC” (M. McNamara, “Daniel,” in R. C. Fuller [ed.], A New Catholic Commentary on Holy Scripture [London: Nelson, 1969], 650–75 [664]; see also A. Lacocque, The Book of Daniel [trans. D. Pellauer; Atlanta: John Knox, 1979], 153). The fact is that Seleucus IV had two sons, Demetrius and Antiochus; after Seleucus IV’s death, his brother Antiochus IV adopted the latter and then executed him (see below). Redditt (P. L. Redditt, Daniel [Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1999], 122–23) agrees that Seleucus IV, Demetrius and Antiochus seem to be the three but considers Bentzen’s idea that it was the latter two and Ptolemy Philometor to be a
kings are Seleucids. Thus the theory endorsed by both Collins and Goldingay (to name two prominent commentaries on Daniel), as well as in other recent Daniel studies, is that the three displaced kings are Seleucus IV and his sons Demetrius and Antiochus. If so, the writer of the vision certainly does describe, as Collins says, recent events that had occurred within no more than thirteen years before the writing of this passage circa 165 B.C.E. (see note 3 above):

1. Demetrius was exchanged for Antiochus IV at some point in the years 178–175;8
2. Seleucus IV was assassinated in 175,9 and
3. Antiochus, son of Seleucus IV was assassinated in 170.10

possibility (A. Bentzen, Daniel [HAT, 19; Tubingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1952], 65). A very different view is that of Caragounis who thinks that the three are Philip of Aridus, Alexander Aegus and Seleucus IV (C. C. Caragounis, “The Interpretation of the Ten Horns of Daniel 7,” ETL 63 [1987], 106–13 [112–13]).

7 The very idea of “horns” on the fourth beast, which represents Alexander and the Greek/Macedonian kingdoms, probably indicates a separate dynasty. The ten horns are one feature of the beast, along with its iron teeth and bronze claws (7:20). That the ten are all Seleucid kings and princes is the consensus of scholarship (see Collins, Daniel, 320; Charles, Book of Daniel, 179; Montgomery, Daniel, 293; O. Plöger, Das Buch Daniel [KAT, 18; Gütersloh: Mohn, 1965], 116; Rowley, Darius the Mede, 105) and would seem to be the plain meaning of 7:24: “. . . And the ten horns [mean]—from that kingdom, ten kings will arise, and after them another will arise. He will be different from the former ones, and will bring low three kings.” Sib. Or. 3.388–400 seems to assume that the ten represent the Seleucid line, the most powerful Greek dynasty (J. J. Collins, “Sibylline Oracles,” in J. H. Charlesworth [ed.], The Old Testament Pseudepigrapha. Vol. 1: Apocalyptic Literature and Testaments [The Anchor Yale Bible Reference Library; New York: Doubleday, 1983], 317–472 [371]; cf. Goldingay, Daniel, 180). Collins points out that “the horns” in Daniel 7 also may have a more specific reference to the Seleucid dynasty: “Coins of Seleucus I and Antiochus I show royal heads wearing horned helmets” (Collins, Daniel, 299; cf. S. Morenz, “Das Tier mit den Hörnern: Ein Beitrag zu Dan. 7,7f.” ZAW 63 [1951], 151–54). Neither the non-royal assassin Heliodorus nor the Ptolemies fit in this Seleucid list; Ptolemy certainly was not removed from the Seleucid throne. That leaves Seleucus IV and his two sons Demetrius and Antiochus as the likely three horns (so Goldingay, Daniel, 180).

8 Appian seems to say that the exchange took place in 175 (see Syr. 45 below); for 178, see S. V. Tracy, “Greek Inscriptions from the Athenian Agora Third to First Centuries B.C.,” Hesperia 51 (1982), 57–64 (60–62).

9 Following Appian, Syr. 45; see below.

10 Following the “Babylonian King List”; see below.
But if so, in what way did Antiochus IV himself bring these three kings low? While the Aramaic verb *et‘āgarû* “they were uprooted” (7:8; Kethib) is passive, possibly giving the credit for Antiochus IV’s usurpation to God or his heavenly subordinates, the interpretation of the vision in v. 24 states that the little horn itself will bring the three kings down. It is not clear in 7:8 and 20 how the “uprooting” will take place; however, v. 24 is the interpretation of the meaning of the vision, and so the verb used at the end of Dan 7:24 (*yēhašpîl, from the root špîl* in the Aramaic *Haphel*) is important for my purpose here: Antiochus IV is the active force that brings the three horns low.\(^{11}\) In a sense, both the passive sense of v. 8 and 20 and the active sense of v. 24 appear to be correct in light of the theology of the writer of Dan 7, who is seen by many scholars to be a member of the *mâśkîlîm*.\(^{12}\) All events are the work of God, but the acting out of God’s will is still the work of humans. Still, what is crucial is not the initial description of this very symbolic vision but the meaning that is given to that vision, and 7:24 states that Antiochus brought the three horns down.

But again, what did Antiochus IV actually do to be considered the one who brought three Seleucid dynasts low? Collins answers that Antiochus IV benefited from the three kings’ demise or exile but did not actually destroy them; in other words, he ascended to power because of these various events that cleared his way to the kingship, but did not cause those events himself.\(^{13}\) In this view, it is not a historical fact that Antiochus IV “brought down” his brother and nephews but a tendentious construction, in which Antiochus IV is blamed even for those violent deeds that he did not do.\(^{14}\) This is a logical theory. Even if one is aware of the references to the fact

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11 I would note that *špîl* does not only mean “destroy” or “kill”; there are many biblical passages where the verb means, “to humiliate” (e.g. Is 26:5; Prov 25:7), so it is broad enough to describe Demetrius’s fate as of 165, that of hostage rather than king as he should have been after the death of his father Seleucus IV in 175.

12 The connection between the *mâśkîlîm*, a group of Jewish believers, and the composition of part or all of Dan 7–12 is suggested by several references to this group in ch. 11–12 (11:33–35; 12:3, 10). As Davies states, “it is unusual for a biblical book to name the group for whom it claims to speak” (P. R. Davies, “The Scribal School of Daniel,” in J. J. Collins and P. W. Flint [eds.], *The Book of Daniel: Composition and Reception. Vol. 1* [Boston: Brill, 2002], 247–65 [251]). And Collins represents the consensus of modern scholarship when he states in similar fashion: “There can be little doubt that the author of Daniel belonged to this circle” (Collins, *Daniel*, 385).


14 So Bevan: “It would seem, from this chapter of Daniel, that some persons at least attributed the death of Seleucus Philopator to the instigation of Antiochus Epiphanes—that the pious Jews should have believed their persecutor to be capable of any crime, was quite natural” (A. A. Bevan, *A Short Commentary on the Book of Daniel* [Cambridge: Cambridge at the University Press, 1892], 137).
that Antiochus IV was responsible for the death of his nephew Antiochus, son of Seleucus IV (as I shall discuss), it is fair to wonder how it could be said that Antiochus IV actively displaced Seleucus IV, who was assassinated by his own minister Heliodorus, or had anything to do with Demetrius, the elder son of Seleucus IV, a hostage in Rome.

And yet, the biblical understanding of Antiochus IV’s actions and route to success seems very different from this theory; at least two other passages in the Book of Daniel, 8:23–25 and 11:21–24, possibly written by a different hand than Dan 7, adamantly emphasize that Antiochus IV rose to power through nefarious schemes. 8:23–25 predict the rise of a king “impudent and versed in intrigue,” who will destroy “the mighty and the “people of holy ones. By his cunning, he will use deceit successfully. He will make great plans, will destroy many, taking them unawares. . . .” “The mighty” are distinct here from “the people of holy ones” and thus may be the same Seleucid dynasts who are presumably mentioned as the “three horns” in Dan 7. In the same way, as I have shown elsewhere, 11:21–24 may refer to a protracted process of some five years during which Antiochus IV gradually took over the kingdom from the supporters of his brother and nephew. Whether Dan 7–12 is by one hand or several, it seems that these passages are parallel in saying that Antiochus IV rose to power through the kind of political maneuvers that are familiar to students of Hellenistic history. These schemes are clearly not just minor throne room intrigues but earth-shaking moves that enabled Antiochus IV to usurp the crown.

This study will attempt to illuminate a dense web of international political maneuvers that held great significance for the writer of Daniel 7. I will build on the standard interpretation, already recalled above, according to which the three horns mentioned in Daniel 7:8, 20, and 24 are Seleucus IV (d. 175) and his children Demetrius I (hostage in Rome during Antiochus IV’s kingship) and Antiochus (d. 170). I will also follow the suggestion of Will and Walbank that Rome conspired to bring Antiochus IV to power, deliberately sidelining Seleucus IV’s direct heir Demetrius I by requesting him as an hostage in 175, and by engineering in the same year the assassination of Seleucus IV. After Seleucus IV’s death, Antiochus IV publicly presented himself as loyal coregent together with his nephew Antiochus son of Seleucus IV while planning the latter’s assassination, which he effectively ordered in 170.


The argument developed here is that these biblical texts do not merely present a polemical statement against Antiochus IV, as per the standard view; they also reflect an accurate historical assessment that Antiochus IV, supported by Rome and Pergamon, was actively involved in the removal of his brother and nephews in his gradual usurpation of the Seleucid throne.

2. THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE ASSASSINATION OF SELEUCUS IV

Modern scholarship has debated the existence of an international conspiracy in the assassination of Seleucus IV in 175 B.C.E. and the placement of Mithridates, the future Antiochus IV, on the Seleucid throne. Some deny any such plot and insist that the assassination was planned and executed by Heliodorus, Seleucus IV’s minister. Those who think that there was external influence are particularly interested in whether Rome was involved; some believe that the first step in the plan was the exchange of Mithridates/Antiochus IV for Demetrius as the prize Seleucid hostage in Rome. Those who reject the idea that Rome was part of a conspiracy include Gruen, who states that at this time Rome and the Seleucid Empire were in a period of “continued harmony” demonstrated by the “fact” that Seleucus IV sent Demetrius to Rome “as a gesture of good will.” Green thinks that Eumenes of Pergamon was involved but not Rome. Others have suggested that it was the Ptolemies, and not Rome, who inspired Heliodorus’s plot.

17 Mithridates was the name of the future Antiochus IV before he took the dynastic name at some point after the death of his older brother Antiochus in 193/2. He probably did not take this name until he became king or regent, i.e., not before 175 at least (J. D. Grainger, A Seleukid Prosopography and Gazetteer [Leiden: Brill, 1997], 22).


20 Gruen, Hellenistic World, 646.

21 P. Green, Alexander to Actium: The Historical Evolution of the Hellenistic Age (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), 429; R. M. Errington,
In my view, there are indeed some grounds for assuming that Rome was involved in the plans to put their former hostage, Antiochus IV, on the Seleucid throne; and that, consequently, together with Pergamon they had a hand in the assassination of Seleucus IV by the Seleucid minister Heliodorus. As Walbank states, “...the exchange of hostages (Demetrius for Antiochus IV) ... the speed of his [Antiochus IV’s] intervention in concert with Pergamum the moment Seleucus’ murder was announced, and that murder itself, all indicate a carefully prepared plot between Rome and Pergamum, with Heliodorus as perhaps the unconscious agent or dupe. The theory, though beyond proof, is attractive.”

Although there are other elements that may corroborate this view, especially when we consider Roman policy concerning hostages, Walbank is certainly right when he emphasizes the remarkable timing involved in Antiochus IV’s accession to the throne. According to the Babylonian King List, Antiochus IV moved from the status of a former hostage-prince in Athens to that of at least regent—and presumably de facto sovereign—of the kingdom within nineteen days, from the sixth of the month Ulûlu (September 3, 175) until the end of that month (Sept. 22, 175):

Year 137, Ulûlu [= month VI], the tenth: Sc(leucus IV), the king, died . . . The same month: An(tiochus IV Epiphanes), his son, sat on the throne. He reigned 11 years. The same year, Arahsamna [= month VIII]: An(tiochus IV) and An(tiochus), his son, (ruled) as kings. [Year 1]42, Abu [= month V], at the command of An(tiochus IV), the king, An(tiochus), the king, his son, was put to death.24 [Year 14]3, An(tiochus ruled as) king (alone).

22 See the discussion and bibliography in Gera, *Judaea and Mediterranean Politics*, 111 n. 11.
24 A. Sachs and J. Wiseman, “A Babylonian King List of the Hellenistic Period,” *Iraq* 16 (1954), 202–12. Sachs and Wiseman only say that this cuneiform list (B.M. 35603) was written after 175, but we know that it had to have been written after the recording of the assassination of the boy Antiochus who was killed between July 30 and August 30 in 170 B.C.E., and after the report that Antiochus IV ruled as sole king in 169 B.C.E. The last five or six lines are too damaged to reconstruct, but the upper and left edges of the tablet seem to be the colophon that presents details about the reign of Demetrius I. Demetrius I was the firstborn son and legitimate heir of Seleucus IV for whom dynastic legitimacy was the issue of his life in the face of the usurpation of the throne by his uncle Antiochus IV, his cousin (Antiochus IV’s real son) Antiochus V Eupator, and Alexander Balas. Demetrius is placed in the king list to the exclusion of these rulers who would thus be called “pretenders” or “usurpers.” This tablet may have been written c. 161 B.C.E. after the victory of Demetrius I over Timarchus of Miletus. The list may have wanted to stress that Antiochus
This text is valuable for giving us the date of Seleucus IV’s death, September 3, 175, and for confirming what we know from astronomical diaries, namely, that it was only in 169 that Antiochus IV became sole king. The list, however, contains a major error. Antiochus IV was not the son but the brother of Seleucus IV. In addition, the list is somewhat confusing in that Antiochus IV did not kill his own son in 170; he killed his adopted son, the boy Antiochus, son of Seleucus IV, the legitimate king.

3. Antiochus, Son of Seleucus IV

It has often been assumed, and with good reasons, that Antiochus IV was responsible for the death of his nephew Antiochus, one of the three “horns” mentioned in Dan 7. Diodorus Siculus (30.7.2) discusses how Andronicus executed Antiochus, son of Seleucus IV while Antiochus IV was campaigning in Cilicia: “Andronicus, who assassinated the son of Seleucus and who was in turn put to death, willingly lent himself to an impious and terrible crime, only to share the same fate as his victim. For it is the practice of potentates to save themselves from charges at the expense of their friends.” Since Andronicus was an official of Antiochus IV, it is fair to assume that the latter ordered the killing, only to execute Andronicus on his return. A fragment from John of Antioch (F 58) states that Antiochus IV killed a son of his brother Seleucus and placed the responsibility for the murder on others, whom he also killed. One imagines Antiochus IV proclaiming his innocence, insisting that he was in another country at the time and showing his rage at the killing of the innocent boy. This is exactly the kind of violent intrigue and monumental lie of which he is accused in the Book of Daniel. The evidence from both Babylonian and Roman sources, then, constitutes a historical tradition that Antiochus IV had his nephew killed.

While it is true that the Babylonian King List makes it seem as if Antiochus IV reigned as of October 175, there is a very different way to read this text. Grzybek says that the first mentioned Antiochus IV killed the true heir, the boy Antiochus, son of Seleucus IV (and brother of Demetrius I).

26 This analysis is indebted to O. Mørkholm, Antiochus IV of Syria (Copenhagen: Gyldendalske Boghandel, 1966), 42–50.
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Antiochus in BKL is the boy Antiochus, son of Seleucus IV and not, as in the translation and reconstruction cited here, Antiochus IV. The list should read: “The same month: Antiochus, his (Seleucus IV’s) son, ascended the throne. He reigned for eleven years.” The list would thus insist that despite the boy Antiochus’s death at the hands of Antiochus IV after five years of co-regency, the whole reign of Antiochus IV, the eleven years from 175–164, really belonged to that boy king. Grzybek states that the Babylonian King List is thereby attacking Antiochus IV by listing the boy Antiochus, son of Seleucus IV, and not Antiochus IV as the true king for that period. 29 Grzybek is literally correct as the boy Antiochus, and not Antiochus IV, was Seleucus IV’s son.

Antiochus son of Seleucus IV was king after his father’s death in 175 for a period of time until his uncle Antiochus IV became sole king after executing him in 170. Seleucid coins show the boy Antiochus as king for more than a few weeks. 30 As I have shown elsewhere at length, 31 we have several series of coins with the boy’s name and with different portraits that reflect the passage of time. Antiochus son of Seleucus IV must have been king by himself for the period of time that it would take to create and mint these series of coins. The coins overlap with the time when Antiochus IV had supposedly achieved power. The fact that Antiochus IV only executed the boy Antiochus in 170 may reflect a five year process during which Antiochus only gradually, and through intrigue, became the sole king.

Moreover, Dan 11:20–24 can be taken to mean that there was a great deal more to what happened in the years 175–170 than any of our other sources tell us. 32 There would be no need for five verses if the accession were immediate; the five verses imply a sequence of events. Antiochus IV only “rises to power” in v. 22. It is only in v. 23 that the passage speaks about the point at which an alliance is made with Antiochus IV and how from that time “he will practice deceit; and he will rise to power with a small band.” Why mention that he rises to power with a small band if he already has power? 33 The emphasis about deceit and machinations under-

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29 E. Grzybek, “Zu einer babylonischen Königsliste aus der hellenistischen Zeit (Keilschrifttafel BM 35603),” Historia 41 (1992), 190–204.
30 O. Mørkholm, Studies in the Coinage of Antiochus IV of Syria (Historisk-filologiske Meddelelser udgivet af Det Kongelige Danske Videnskabernes Selskab 40/3; Copenhagen: E. Munksgaard, 1963), 23–24. Interestingly, scholars postulated the existence of another son of Seleucus IV before knowledge of the Babylonian King List and before Mørkholm’s breakthrough study of the coins proved the existence of a young Antiochus who became king after his father’s death; see e.g. Montgomery, Daniel, 293.
31 Scolnic, “Seleucid Coinage.”
mines the assumption that Antiochus IV was king in 175. He would not have to invade the provinces “unawares” in v. 24 if he were the king. These verses speak of a complicated process very different from a quick seizure of power.

4. THE EXCHANGE OF THE HOSTAGE DEMETRIUS FOR ANTIOCHUS IV

If Antiochus IV was involved in an international plot intended to remove other Seleucid dynasts—the three “horns” of Dan 7,—one of whom being Demetrius, the plot included (a) Rome’s request to exchange Antiochus IV for a very young Demetrius, and (b) allowing Antiochus IV to replace Seleucus IV after the latter was assassinated. Roman instigation of the exchange might indicate Rome’s complicity in a plot to make Antiochus IV king. If, however, Seleucus IV offered his eldest son as a substitute, it becomes less likely that Rome had anything to do with the ensuing tumultuous events in Antioch. Those who do not think that there was a conspiracy and that Seleucus IV sent Demetrius to Rome as a gesture of political conciliation base their approach on the following passage in Appian’s History of Rome (Syrian Wars 45):

Thus the Romans dealt with their spoils (lit. “won by the spear”). After the death of Antiochus the Great (King), his son

34 Mørkholm, Antiochus IV; Walbank, Polybius, 465–66. Walbank (F. W. Walbank, “Polybius and Rome’s Eastern Policy,” JRS 53 [1963], 1–13) presents an important caution about attributing imperialistic motivations to Rome concerning Greece and the Hellenistic kingdoms in this period. I want to differentiate, however, between imperialism, meaning the policy of conquering foreign countries, and careful maneuvering to weaken opponents and potential opponents. I also stress that by “Rome” I do not necessarily mean official, explicit Roman policy but some actors, perhaps a small group in the Senate, who were involved in the kind of conspiracy suggested here. On the other hand, the hostage demand could evidently have come from the highest levels of power and government only.
Seleucus became his successor. Then he (Seleucus) released his brother Antiochus from Roman hostage, substituting his own son Demetrius. While Antiochus was returning, released from his position as hostage, and he was still near Athens, Seleucus died as a result of a conspiracy of Heliodorus, a member of the court. But Eumenes and Attalus drove Heliodorus, who had seized power by force, and they settled it on Antiochus, gaining his goodwill to their cause; because of some quarrels, they now looked with distrust on the Romans. Thus Antiochus, son of Antiochus the Great, became master of Syria.\textsuperscript{35} One may read this passage and think that Seleucus sent his son Demetrius to Rome to replace Antiochus as soon as he succeeded his father. It is clear, however, that Appian simply reviews a few significant events in Seleucus IV’s life, and his brief survey tends to simplify both the events and their chronology. The facts are, however, more complex. Seleucus IV became king on the death of his father Antiochus III on July 3, 187 B.C.E.; at that time, Demetrius was presumably either not yet born or he was an infant; thus Seleucus could not have provided his son Demetrius as a hostage for some years to come. Seleucus IV was killed on September 3, 175, twelve years after Antiochus III died. Mørkholm states that while Appian’s narrative makes it seem that Seleucus decided to send Demetrius, it is “more probable that the exchange of hostages was the result of a Roman demand.”\textsuperscript{36} I agree with him on this point, and will examine whether Rome or Seleucus selected Demetrius as the new principal hostage by asking: Who selected principal hostages in Roman treaty arrangements, the recipient kingdom (Rome) or the donor kingdom (the Seleucids)? We need to look both at the general evidence about this specific historical situation and at the selection of principal political hostages in that era. I will explore some reasons why one should seriously doubt that Seleucus IV freely chose to send Demetrius to Rome, and why it is more likely that he was forced to do so. For the most part, the argument runs as follows:

1. Rome, not the donor state, selected prize hostages;
2. Pre-mortem succession\textsuperscript{37} and the significance of young heirs and monarchs in Hellenistic kingdoms indicate that Seleucus IV would not willingly send his heir to Rome;
3. Thus, while a king of a donor state would not willingly send his heir, Rome could however demand him.

\textsuperscript{35} My translation.
\textsuperscript{36} Mørkholm, \textit{Antiochus IV}, 36.
\textsuperscript{37} As I will explain below, this means that the heir is already recognized as king or co-regent during his father’s reign.
If these points can be established, Seleucus IV probably did not willingly send Demetrius. One can then consider the idea that Rome demanded Demetrius as a hostage for its own political motives, and that Antiochus IV was a key element in this conspiracy that would take him to the Seleucid throne.

5. **ROMAN HOSTAGE-TAKING IN THE LATE THIRD AND EARLY SECOND CENTURY B.C.E.**

Hostage-taking provided the Romans with the opportunity to expose potential future leaders of neighboring peoples to Roman political and cultural influences, in the expectation that after their return to their home countries, these former hostages, now in their primes, would likely hold positions of power and would favor Roman interests. For the Romans, hostage-taking was a very useful way of preparing unwitting agents for the “neutralization,” if not the disruption, of foreign kingdoms. The Romans usually specified that the hostages be the sons of leading men from the kingdoms in question, and it was normal for these hostages to be held by the Romans for a number of years. Rome did not want the hostages that the leaders of the donor states would select for their own reasons. It is possible that the donor governments sometimes made suggestions and that the Romans then had the right of approval. All that we see are the end results; we are not informed about the negotiations that led to the results of who was selected.

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40 Walker, *Hostages in Republican Rome*, i–vi. Walker provides a comprehensive survey of the evidence; in 48 cases, there is an explicit statement concerning which party chose the hostages. If Rome knew enough of the donor kingdom’s political situation, it could demand specific hostages. Walker states: “... the temptation to be rid of worthless persons or political rivals would be enormous to a leader permitted to nominate his own hostage to a foreign power; the quality of such a hostage would be minimal” (Walker, *Hostages in Republican Rome*, 45); cf. A. Aymard, “Les otages barbares au début de l’empire,” *JRJF* 51 (1961), 136–42 (141). How did replacement of hostages work? The Carthaginians asked for an exchange in 199 B.C.E. (Livy 32.2.3) and Masgaba of Numidia proposed a substitution of Hanno son of Hamilcar in 168 B.C.E. (Livy 45.14.5); these facts seem to indicate that an exchange could occur when one or the other party requested it. But Rome always was in control, as it reminded Masgaba in the latter case. It seems clear that the Romans arranged exchanges and restorations of the Carthaginian principal hostages as political expediency dictated.

41 See the Treaty of Zama (Livy 30.37.6) and the armistice with Nabis.
With regard to Appian’s testimony, therefore, we need to take into account not only the fact that we have a later Roman report (which would have reason to be skewed), but also that this report informs us only about the end result and tells us nothing about the previous negotiations. The latter may very well have been strained and difficult, especially in a case like this where a king was being forced to send his eldest son and heir. In other words, although Appian says that Seleucus IV sent Demetrius to Rome to replace Antiochus, this should not be interpreted to mean that Seleucus was willing to do so, even less that he designated his son himself. I will return to Appian’s account below.

6. **THE TREATY OF APAMEA**

According to Appian, the Treaty of Apamea in 188 B.C.E. between the Roman Republic and Antiochus III stated that the latter

\[
\begin{align*}
& \text{must give twenty hostages, whom the consul will select, and} \\
& \text{pay for the cost of the present war, incurred on his account,} \\
& \text{500 Euboic talents down and 2500 more when the Senate ratifies the treaty; and 12,000 more during twelve years, each} \\
& \text{yearly installment to be delivered in Rome. . . . That part of the} \\
& \text{money which was to be paid down, and the twenty hostages,} \\
& \text{were furnished. Among the latter was Antiochus, the younger} \\
& \text{son of Antiochus.}
\end{align*}
\]

Polybius (21.42.22) states that Antiochus III had to give twenty hostages, whom the consul would select. They were to be exchanged every three years. The Syrians were required to provide hostages only for the twelve years during which indemnity payments were due. Several sources (e.g. Polybius 21.32.9–10; 21.42.22–23; Livy 32.2.1–3) suggest a close connection between the schedule of indemnity payments and the terms for which hostages were detained. Three contemporary Roman treaties covered different lengths of time; the treaty with Carthage in 201 was for fifty years, the treaty with the Aetolians made in 189 was for six years and the Treaty of Apamea made with Antiochus III in 188 was for twelve years. The actual period during which hostages were sent can sometimes be calculated from the treaty’s date and the date of the last reference to that group of hostages; Carthage provided hostages for the period 201–168 B.C.E., Philip V of Macedon for 196–191 B.C.E., and Antiochus III (188–187) and Seleucus IV (187–175) for 188–175 B.C.E. Hostages were submitted at the beginning of the armistice and were retained as a guarantee for the maintenance of the treaty’s terms. In particular, the hostages ex-

\[\text{in 195 B.C.E. (Livy 34.35.11).}\]

\[\text{42 The Treaty of Apamea was written after the Roman victories in the battle of Thermopylae (in 191 B.C.E.), the Battle of Magnesia (in 190) and} \]

\[\text{Roman and Rhodian naval victories over the Seleucid navy.}\]

\[\text{43 Appian, Syr. 39 and see at length below.}\]
acted by a treaty guaranteed the financial clauses of the agreement. As Lee concludes, “Their purpose was to act as guarantees for the duration of the truce during which the terms of the peace settlement were being implemented. Once these terms had been implemented, the hostages were returned.”

Yet the historical reality for the payments based on the Treaty of Apamea was more complicated, and this is of great interest here. If the payments began in 188/87, they were supposed to end twelve years later, 176/75. According to Livy 42.6.3, however, the indemnity payments were not completed until at least 173 (two/three years later than scheduled). This means that the terms of the pact were still in the process of being met fifteen years after the treaty was made. Livy states that the representative of Antiochus IV came to Rome with a payment and spoke in apologetic, positive and conciliatory terms; Rome graciously accepted the late payment.

There is no reference to Demetrius. While we can understand that a hostage was necessary until the payment was made in full, why was any hostage held after the payment was made in 173? It is possible, however, that the whole indemnity of the treaty was not paid off even in 173. 2 Macc 8:10 may be an independent witness to the fact that the whole sum still was not paid off in 165: “Nicanor undertook to make up for the king the tribute (still owed) to the Romans, which came to 2000 talents, by making the Jews captives. . .” Reading the Livy passage in this light, it seems that

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44 The Samians gave hostages as security for their indemnity payments (Plutarch, Per. 88.1); Nicias proposed that the Syracusans keep Athenian troops to guarantee the Athenian repayment of Syracusan war expenses (Thucydides 7.83.2; Plutarch, Nic. 27.2); Caesar demanded hostages for the promised subsidies (Caesar, Gal. 6.2.2).


46 The terms of the treaty began in 188. Allowing a year at the beginning and saying that the first annual payment was in 187, the last payment should have been in 175.

47 Translation by D. R. Schwartz, 2 Maccabees (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2008), 321–23. Note that Nicanor attempts to find the funds for not one year’s indemnity of 1000 talents but two. Judas Maccabaeus, however, soundly defeats Nicanor so he does not accomplish his mission of raising the funds to pay the tribute (2 Macc 8:36). Most commentators have assumed that this passage is a kind of mistaken demonstration of supposed historical knowledge because they think that the Livy passage describes the end of the Seleucid payments (see J. A. Goldstein, II Maccabees [AB, 41A; New York: Doubleday, 1983], 328–29; Mørkholm, Antiochus IV, 65 n. 4). Schwartz, however, focuses attention on Livy’s actual language in the scene in 173: Appollonius in senatum introductus multis instissque causis regem excusavit, quod stipendium serius quam ad diem praestaret; id se omnem advocisse, ne cuius nisi temporis gratia regi fieri. In his speech to the Senate, the Seleucid ambassador Appollonius “alleged many valid reasons why the king was paying his tribute after the appointed day. He had, however, brought the whole amount, so that no favour need be shown to the king.
the expansive rhetoric of the Seleucid emissaries is due to the fact that the whole indemnity has still not been paid off in 173; they are anxious because this late, partial payment may not be acceptable to the Romans. The Seleucid ambassador uses impassioned rhetoric in the Livy passage not just because an annual payment is two or three years late, but also because, fifteen years after the treaty’s terms were set, the tribute still has not been completed.

If the tribute was still not complete by 165, this may explain another historical moment: namely, Rome’s refusal to release Demetrius after the death of his uncle Antiochus IV in 163 may have been based on the fact that after twenty-five years, the tribute still had not been paid off, so that Rome could legitimately, by the very terms of that treaty, insist on keeping Demetrius.48 In any event, the Senate’s motivation to keep Demetrius, son of Seleucus IV and the rightful heir to the throne, as hostage, was apparently that Rome had an advantage in having Syria being nominally ruled by a boy and his regent, rather than by the now adult Demetrius (Polybius 31.12; Appian, Syr. 8.46). This is exactly the same reason for which the Romans may have wanted Seleucus IV’s second son Antiochus and his uncle Antiochus IV to be king and regent respectively in 175.

Thus in 176/75, the end of the twelve year period prescribed by the treaty, the tribute had not been paid off and the principal hostage (Antiochus IV) was no longer important. Rome demanded a new important hostage, the heir to the throne, Demetrius, because his father Seleucus IV had not yet paid off the debt. Since, again, the treaty was concluded in 188/87, 176/75 was a significant year as it marked what should have been the end of the hostage/tribute arrangement. That Rome demanded Demetrius, now twelve years old in 175, as a hostage for tribute still owed in that year makes perfect sense in this context.

Since 175 was the year of the assassination of Seleucus IV, a period of transition ensued during which Antiochus IV needed time in order to consolidate his power over forces that were set against him, presumably including Heliodorus and the supporters of Antiochus, son of Seleucus IV. The Romans would have been beyond excusing the delay” (trans. C. Roberts; London: J. M. Dent, 1905). Schwartz shows how the Latin term stipendium usually refers to the annual stipend, not the whole indemnity. That is, the emissaries might not have brought the end of the tribute but a delayed annual payment from a previous year. During the turbulence surrounding the assassination of Seleucus IV and the accession to the kingship by Antiochus IV, it would make sense that the annual stipend had not been raised or delivered. 48 In two appeals to the Senate (Polybius 31.2.1–6), Demetrius does not say that the indemnity has been paid in full and that he should therefore be released. While Allen mentions Demetrius to argue that the duration of the holding of hostages by Rome may not have been tied to the full payment of tribute, the issue should at least be considered open to further investigation. See Allen, Hostages and Hostage-Taking, 41–42.
willing to be patient with regard to the payment of the tribute if they were happy with the resulting power structure. Holding Demetrius, the heir to the Seleucid throne, as an hostage presented a twofold advantage for Rome: while it was a necessary condition for Antiochus IV to gain control and consolidate his power, Demetrius could always be used as a weapon against him if he failed to do Rome’s will.

7. **The Heir as Hostage**

As the third son of Antiochus III, Mithridates/Antiochus IV was never expected to succeed to the Seleucid throne, and was sent to Rome as a hostage after his father’s defeat by the Romans in 191–89 B.C.E. When he was sent in 188, his father Antiochus III was very much alive and there was no reason to think that his death was imminent, as it proved to be when he died during a raid in the east. Antiochus III’s heir was Seleucus IV; Mithridates was at best a second heir. This seems to follow a pattern discussed by Allen, that kings “tended to protect their first born or their most valuable heir from the institution, and instead submit their youngest offspring, or those who had the least relative legitimacy to rule.”

No country would ever want to send their most valuable heir as a hostage. The very stability of the dynasty depended on legitimate succession. On the other hand, the more valuable the heir, the more valuable the hostage; the hostage could turn into a very important ally or vassal, and the host country could pursue its long-term international goals. Kings who had to deliver hostages tried to protect their most valuable heirs and the hostage-taking countries were most interested in the very same dynasts.

In its foreign policy during the second century B.C.E., Rome often chose to back “a rival claimant rather than to support even an established friend: the Attalids, especially Eumenes II and his brother Attalus; the Ptolemies Philometor and Physcon; Demetrius of Macedon; and Demetrius of Syria.” An “ambitious pretender” like Antiochus IV could cooperate with Roman interests. Rome

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49 Allen, *Hostages and Hostage-Taking*, 144–45; see also Walker, *Hostages in Republican Rome*, 276–80. When the Macedonian Alexander II was defeated by Thebes, he was forced to give hostages, including his younger brother Philip II. After Alexander II was assassinated in 368, Ptolemy ruled as regent for Alexander’s fifteen-year-old son Perdiccas III until the latter killed him three years later and gained control. Philip returned to Macedon a year later. When Perdiccas III died in 360, his infant son, Amyntas IV succeeded him. Philip II was appointed regent but soon gained full control. Notice the elements we have here: Philip II is the youngest son who is sent away as a hostage. He is appointed regent for his infant nephew and then takes the throne for himself. This is exactly what Antiochus IV does.

could, when it suited its purposes, take the heir as its principal hostage.\textsuperscript{51}

\textbf{8. THE IMPORTANCE OF YOUNG HEIRS}

We know enough about pre-mortem succession and the significance of even very young heirs and kings in Hellenistic kingdoms to be certain that Seleucus IV would not willingly send his heir to Rome. A quick survey of some of the Seleucid kings reflects the tenuousness of the kings’ lives, their desire to create a smooth succession, and the fact that princes could become kings at a young age. Antiochus II, born in 286, became joint-king with his father Antiochus I in 265 at the age of twenty-one after his older brother Seleucus was executed; he then became sole king in 246. Seleucus II Callinicus, born in 260, became king at 14 when his father Antiochus II suddenly died in 246 (he ruled 246–225 B.C.E.). Seleucus III Ceraunus, originally named Alexander, was born in 243 and took the throne name Seleucus when he became king at the age of 17/18 on the sudden death of his father Seleucus II in 225. Antiochus III (ruled 223–187 B.C.E.) was born in 241 and was about 18 when his brother Seleucus III was assassinated in 223. He may have been viceroy of the east before he became king. Seleucus IV Philopator became heir in 193 and joint-king in 192 after the death of his older brother Antiochus. He succeeded his father when Antiochus III died in the east in 187. Antiochus, son of Seleucus IV, seems to have ruled at least in name at the age of five and then as co-king with Antiochus IV until his uncle killed him five years later.\textsuperscript{52} To take a contemporary example from the Ptolemies: Ptolemy V Epiphanes (204–181 B.C.E.), became king when

\textsuperscript{51} An interesting example is that of Nabis, ruler of Sparta who, after his defeat to Rome in 195 B.C.E., was forced to send hostages to Rome. Nabis’s son Armenes, the only son that we know of, was the principal hostage brought back in triumph along with Demetrius of Macedon (Livy 34:52). Armenes died some time later in Rome. After Nabis was assassinated, a boy from outside the family was made king for a short while (a fleeting last gasp of Spartan independence), making us assume that Armenes did not have any brothers. This example shows that Rome could take the heir from a defeated nation (Livy 34:41; cf. P. Cartledge and A. Spawforth, \textit{Hellenistic and Roman Sparta: A Tale of Two Cities} [New York: Routledge, 2002], 70–71).

\textsuperscript{52} While he reigned at a later point than Seleucus IV and so obviously could not have informed his thinking, another example of a Seleucid child-king is Antiochus V Eupator, who succeeded Antiochus IV. He was born c. 173 (a birth that might have led to the death of his cousin Antiochus, son of Seleucus IV), became king at the age of nine in 164 (when Antiochus IV died) and ruled under the guardianship of Lysias. Lysias actually became what Heliodorus may have wanted to be, ruler through guardianship, as in the Macedonian example. Another later example might be Seleucus son of Antiochus VII and Cleopatra, who may have become king when he was less than ten years old.
he was only five years old. To take a contemporary example from
the Antigonids of Macedon, Philip V (238–179 B.C.E.) son of
Demetrius II, was just nine when his father was killed (229 B.C.E.).
His father’s cousin Antigonus Doson married his mother and ruled
as king. Instead of usurping power for himself, Philip’s stepfather
prepared his ward to be king. Philip was just seventeen when
Antigonus died (221 B.C.E.).

Again, considering the life expectancies of kings and the
potential to die in war or by assassination, a king would think con-
stantly about perpetuating the dynasty through a chosen successor.
Child kings might have been vulnerable from both inside and out-
side their kingdoms, but these examples of their importance and the
constant threats to the persons of the kings speak to how
strange it would be for Seleucus IV to send his heir Demetrius as a
hostage. Would a king in this system ever consider initiating the
sending of his heir for any amount of time to a foreign power?
Would he want his son, at the most impressionable age, to be
impressed with Roman culture? Seleucus IV would not willingly
send his heir to Rome.

If the donor state selected the hostage, this would mean that
Seleucus IV chose his first-born son and heir, at around the age of
ten or twelve, to go to Rome for an extended period of time (what
turned out to be 13–16 years), knowing that this son would come
to manhood and his majority in Rome. When he sent Demetrius
away, Seleucus IV knew that if he would die, his heir would not be
living in the kingdom and it would be up to Rome to decide if he
could come back at all. Furthermore, Demetrius would not be “in
the loop” of governance and would not have learned how to rule as
king according to Seleucid traditions. This is a most improbable
scenario, even if we posit Seleucus IV’s desire to allay Roman sus-
picions about his broader international intentions. Rome must have
demanded Demetrius.

9. Why Rome Wanted Demetrius as a Hostage

If Seleucus IV did not willingly send Demetrius, why did Rome
request him as a hostage? The hostage exchange, on the face of it,
made perfect sense: since Antiochus IV was now only the brother
of Seleucus IV, that king’s oldest son was a hostage of much
greater quality. But I believe that much more was at stake. In its
own quiet but clever way that has kept many ancient historians and
modern scholars from seeing its hand at play, Rome moved against
Seleucus IV, son of their enemy Antiochus III, by demanding
Demetrius as the new prize hostage. For Rome, Seleucus IV was a
king who had seen his great father lose a war to Rome, who needed
time to rebuild, who saw the value of alliances, who had every
intention of seeing his domain expand. Seleucus IV named his first
son Demetrius, an Antigonid name that had previously been
unknown to the Seleucid dynasty, symbolizing his desire to strengthen ties with the Macedonians. He married his daughter Laodice to Perseus in 178/177, certainly a strong political gesture in the direction of an anti-Roman alliance. Thus a grandson of Seleucus IV, the son of Perseus and Laodice, would be the next king of Macedon, while a nephew Ptolemy VI (born 186), son of Seleucus IV’s sister Cleopatra I and Ptolemy V, would sit on the throne of Egypt. To show the very importance of such alliances, it is worth recalling that just before his death in 180, Ptolemy V had planned to make war against the Seleucid kingdom; but when Cleopatra started to rule she immediately ended the war preparations directed against her brother Seleucus. While one should not overstate matters to say that Rome was concerned that one big Hellenistic family could unite against it, one should admit that something was developing among the kingdoms, each of which had everything to lose by the coming of Rome.

In 175, Demetrius was becoming dangerously close in age to being able to function as king, whereas his younger brother Antiochus was years away from this capacity. Rome demanded Demetrius as he was approaching the age when he might become co-king with his father, thus negating his chances of becoming king. With Demetrius as a hostage, Rome would now control the rightful heir to the Seleucid throne; it could keep Demetrius or send him back at a later point to fight against his younger brother Antiochus and split the kingdom. If Seleucus IV would die, his second son Antiochus would be king, and his uncle and regent Antiochus IV could control him. Rome wanted someone it could trust on the Seleucid throne. By demanding Demetrius as a hostage and sending the future Antiochus IV home, it would at least give the latter a chance to gain power.

Rome therefore may have wanted Seleucus IV dead and the at least seemingly pro-Roman Mithridates/ Antiochus IV in his place, thus disrupting the Seleucid succession and keeping control of Demetrius, the true heir, in case it wanted to send him home at a later point and create dynastic problems. As Will has suggested, it may be that the Roman ultimatum delivered by Popilius at Eleusis in 168 may have included a threat to send Demetrius, the rightful

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54 Laodice was escorted across the seas by the Rhodian fleet with great fanfare, a fact well documented by the ancient sources. The people of Delos honored her with an inscription that includes the names of her father and her husband; cf. SIG 3:639; Polybius 25.4.8–10; Livy 42.12.3–4; Appian, *Mac.* 11.2; Mørkholm, *Antiochus IV*, 34–35; J. M. Helliesen, “A Note on Laodice Number Twenty,” *CJ* 75/4 (1980), 295–98.

heir, home to Syria, undermining Antiochus IV’s legitimacy. Some day, when the time would be right, Demetrius might succeed Antiochus IV; thus Rome would have two co-opted ex-hostages who would be primary candidates for the Seleucid crown, one now and one in the future.

Gruen’s thesis is that Rome did not have designs on the conquest of the world and therefore did not hatch this assassination plot. But conquering the world is something different from maintaining a controlled peace with the Seleucids while fighting Macedon and Carthage. Rome would still need to defeat the rising power of Perseus of Macedon, but now it could do this without being forced to worry about the Seleucids. Rome may not have been set to conquer the Hellenistic world at this point, but it did want to make sure that the Hellenistic monarchs did not present a united force. Mattingly thinks that, “Rome evidently acquiesced in the turn of events.” Acquiescence implies a passive spectator. I believe that Rome was much more than this and was thinking logically about its future interests.

In short, it appears that the assassination of Seleucus IV created possibilities so beneficial to Rome that at the very least one should admit the plausibility of its participation and complicity.

10. Antiochus IV AND His RELATIONSHIP WITH ROME
The author(s) of Daniel may have been correct in portraying Antiochus IV as a central player in all of these plans and events, for it might have been the clever and ambitious Mithridates/Antiochus IV who instigated the plot. Imagine if he came to his Roman hosts in 176/75 (or even earlier) with the following proposition: “The twelve years that I have spent as a hostage according to the terms of the schedule of payments in the Treaty of Apamea soon will be over. I suggest that you demand Seleucus’s eldest son Demetrius as the new principal hostage. Seleucus is at odds with one of his main ministers, Heliodorus, over economic and political policies. As soon as I am released, in fact, while I am on my way home, Heliodorus will assassinate Seleucus. Arrange the support of your vassal Eumenes II of Pergamon, who has good reason to be afraid of Seleucus and who has everything to gain by having me as an ally. With this support, I will become regent for the new king, Seleucus’s

56 Will, Histoire politique, 322. At the next juncture, after Antiochus IV’s death in 164, Rome did not release Demetrius, demonstrating that it considered every such move carefully and nourished its control over the Seleucid monarchy.

57 Gruen, Hellenistic World, 646.

second son, the young child Antiochus. I will wait until I am in control of the kingdom before I kill him. And you will never have to worry about the East again.”

I can postulate this kind of relationship between Antiochus and Rome because of a number of pieces of evidence.

1. The Romans never had any kind of conflict with Antiochus IV or the Seleucid kingdom as long as he lived.

2. While he was a hostage in Rome, Antiochus IV lived in a palatial estate (Asconius, in Pisonem 13.16–17) and seems to have been quite appreciative of his treatment and status; he later sent envoys to Rome with a flattering message of gratitude for the way he was treated as a prince more than a hostage. In response, the Senate ordered that there should be a renewal of the alliance “with Antiochus which had existed with his father” (Livy 42.6.6–11). Note that Seleucus IV is not mentioned.

3. Antiochus IV modeled not only his dress but also his kingdom after Roman ways. Polybius tells us that after Antiochus was released and eventually assumed the throne, he wore a toga, and seemed to campaign like a Roman candidate for office. As if he had won, he sat “on an ivory curule chair, after the fashion of the Romans . . .” (Polybius 26.1.1–7). He behaved like a Roman magistrate in Antioch (Polybius 26.1.5–6; Diodorus 29.32; Livy 41.20.1). Antiochus reviewed the soldiers armed in Roman fashion in Roman triumphal processions as at Daphne (Polybius 30.25.3–26.1). He put on a gladiatorial exhibition according to Roman custom (Polybius 30.26.1; Livy 41.20.11). He employed a Roman architect, D. Cossutius, to complete the Pisistratid temple to Zeus Olympius in Athens and to build an aqueduct in Antioch (Vitruvius De Arch. 7.praef.15 and 17). It may be that all of this points to an unabashed appreciation of what Rome had done for him. We thus get a sense of Antiochus IV’s “Roman-ness.” As an extremely ambitious man, it was perfectly logical for him to want to imitate what he had seen and to dream of creating his own Rome. Antiochus’s transformation seems to have radically altered the Seleucid political system.  

4. After the events of 175, Rome did not insist on timely payment of the tribute (Livy 42.6.6–12), which may suggest that they understood that it would take Antiochus IV time to gain control of the Seleucid machinery.

5. In the Third Macedonian War between Rome and Macedonia, Perseus sought Antiochus’s support but the latter reassured Rome of his support (Livy 42.29).

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59 Tradunt et Antiochi regis filio obsidi domum publice aedificatam, inter quos Atticus in annalici: quae postea dicitur Lucili poetae fuisse.
60 Grauen, The Hellenistic World, 662 n. 241.
6. The “Day of Eleusis,” a famous historical incident recorded in Polybius 29.27; Livy 45.12; Justin 34.3; Cicero, Phil. 8.8, and referred to in Dan 11:30, may be an indication that Antiochus IV was heavily in Rome’s debt. Gaius Popilius Laenas finds Antiochus at the climax of his conquest of Egypt and literally stops him in his tracks. Livy discusses how Antiochus had received the submission of Memphis and all Egyptians except those in Alexandria, and that in a series of unhurried marches moves toward Alexandria, the last bastion of resistance (Livy 45.12). Four miles from Alexandria, he meets an entourage from Rome. I will cite a version of the story in Justin’s third or fourth century C.E. epitome of Pompeius Trogus’s historical work written in the first century B.C.E. and therefore contemporary with Livy:

Mittitur itaque legatus Popilius ad Antiochum, qui abstinere illum Aegypto aut, si iam incessisset, excedere iuberet. Cum in Aegypto eum invenisset osculumque ei rex obtulisset (nam coluerat inter ceteros Popilium Antiochus, cum obses Romae esset), tunc Popilius facessere interim privatam amicitiam iubet, cum mandata patriae intercedant; prolatoque senatus decreto et tradito, cum cunctari eum videret consultationemque ad amicos referre, ibi Popilius virga, quam in mano gerebat, amplo circulo inclusum, ut amicos caperet, consulere eos iubet nec prius inde exire, quam responsum senatui daret, aut pacem aut bellum cum Romanis habiturum. Adeoque haec austeritas animum regis fregit, ut pariturum se senatui responderet. (34.3)

Popilius was now sent out as an ambassador to Antiochus to tell him to leave Egypt alone, or withdraw from it if he had already invaded. He found Antiochus in Egypt, and when the king made to kiss him (for Popilius was one of the people whose friendship Antiochus had cultivated while a hostage in Rome), Popilius said that their personal friendship had to be in abeyance for the time being since the demands of his fatherland stood in its way. He then produced and handed over the decree of the senate. He saw Antiochus hesitate and refer the matter to his friends for discussion. Using the staff which he was carrying in his hand, Popilius then traced a circle around the king large enough to include the friends, and told them to discuss the matter and not leave the circle until Antiochus gave the senate his answer as to whether he would be at peace or

62 “Ships from Kittim will come against him. He will be checked, and will turn back . . .” See Goldingay, Daniel, 301.
63 Who had served as a consul of the Republic in 172 and would again in 158.
64 For the dates, see J. Yardley, Justin and Pompeius Trogus: A Study of the Language of Justin’s Epitome of Trogus (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2003), 5.
war with the Romans. The toughness of resolve broke the will of the king, making him reply that he would comply with the senate’s orders.\textsuperscript{65}

It took precisely one Roman legate at Eleusis to make Antiochus leave Egypt in the middle of his second invasion with all but Alexandria in his grasp. A single Roman ambassador said, in effect, “We’ve decided that you can’t have Egypt. Go home.” And Antiochus left. Why was one word from one Roman representative sufficient? Why did Rome not need a show of force? Why was Antiochus so compliant in the midst of a second successful invasion, with Rome a power no doubt somewhat exhausted by its recent major effort against Perseus of Macedon?

It is clear that Antiochus and Popilius had a close relationship; I even wonder if the Roman politician had not been involved in the conspiracy. Who better than one of his patrons to tell him that he could not have Egypt? His very presence would remind Antiochus of his debt.

7. Perhaps the close relationship explains why Rome did not mind Antiochus IV’s military buildup, including his building of a navy and adding of war elephants in direct contradiction to the provisions of the Treaty of Apamea; the Senate knew or at least felt that they could trust him because of their involvement in his rise to power. The Treaty of Apamea (Polybius 21.42.12–13) states that Antiochus III will surrender all the elephants he possessed at that time and that he and his successors will not keep any in the future: also, he will not have more than ten warships or any kind of fleet.\textsuperscript{66} And yet, forty-two elephants took part in Antiochus IV’s Daphne procession (Polybius 30.25.11) and he even offered elephants to Rome (Polyaenius. \textit{Strat.} 4.21). Antiochus used his navy in the conquest of Egypt (Livy 44.19.9) and Cyprus (Livy 45.11). It is striking that after Antiochus IV’s death, a Roman legate came to burn the fleet and literally hamstring the elephants (Appian, \textit{Syr.} 46). Why at this point? I would suggest this is because Rome felt that it could no longer pull the strings of the young Seleucid king Antiochus V and his regent Lysias and were unsure what the new king might do; it thus reasserted the provisions of the Treaty of Apamea.

8. It is only after Antiochus IV’s death that Rome confers a political relationship on the Judaeans who had been so rebellious against Antiochus IV. The Roman-Jewish Treaty was an agreement made between Judah Maccabee and the Roman Republic in 161 B.C.E. according to 1 Maccabees 8:17 and Josephus 12.417–19. It was the first recorded contact between the Jewish people and the Romans.\textsuperscript{67} Perhaps the Senate wanted to weaken the regime of


\textsuperscript{67} This embassy and treaty seem to be real. While Sherwin-White
Demetrius I, the Seleucid heir who had escaped his hostage-ship in Rome and taken the Seleucid throne against their will.

The evidence of a strong relationship between Rome and Antiochus IV may point to a successful conspiracy that was mutually beneficial.

11. APAMEA, APPIAN AND ANTIOCHUS IV AS HOSTAGE IN ROME

I have tried to demonstrate that the sending of Demetrius to Rome as a hostage was not Seleucus’ own initiative but must have followed a Roman request/demand. Appian presents the exchange in a different light, however, saying that Seleucus “freed” (ἐξέλυσε) his brother Antiochus. A closer look at Appian in relation to the earlier accounts of Polybius and Livy is therefore necessary.

It is interesting that all that Polybius and Livy tell us about hostages in the Treaty of Apamea is that Antiochus III must give twenty hostages to be replaced every three years (Polybius 21.42.22; Livy 39.38.14–15):

Obsides Romanis uiginti dato et triennio mutato, ne minores octonum denum annorum neu maiores quinum quadragenum (Livy 39.38.14–15).

He shall give the Romans twenty hostages and shall change them triennially, provided that none of them shall be younger than eighteen years nor older than forty-five years.

Appian, however, says that Antiochus III

δοῦναι δὲ καὶ εἴκοσιν δύομα, ἢ ἐν ὁ στρατηγῶς ἐπιγράψῃ.

must give twenty hostages, whom the consul will select (Appian, Syr. 38).

Note well that according to Appian the treaty explicitly states that the Roman consul, not Antiochus III, will select the hostages. The consul must have named Antiochus IV as one of the hostages:

Τοσάδε προύτεινεν ὁ Σκιπίων, καὶ πάντα ἐδέχοντο οἱ πρέσβεις, τὸ τε μέρος αὐτής τῶν χρημάτων καὶ τὰ εἴκοσι δύομα ἔκομιζετο, καὶ ἢν αὐτῶν Ἀντίοχος ὁ νεώτερος ὑός Ἀντίοχου.

All the terms offered by Scipio were accepted by the ambassadors. That part of the money which was to be paid down,

states that it is a forgery created to make the Maccabees look good (A. N. Sherwin-White, Roman Foreign Policy in the East 168 BC to 1 AD [London: Duckworth, 1984], 72), Gera notes the similarity in form between this treaty and other comparable agreements and defends the authenticity of the letter and the mission (Gera, Judaea in Mediterranean Politics, 304–20). See also J. A. Goldstein, I Maccabees (AB, 41; New York: Doubleday, 1976), 346.
and the twenty hostages, were furnished. Among the latter was Antiochus, the younger son of Antiochus.

Appian goes on to say that when the Senate approves the treaty, it clarifies that “the hostages should be changed every third year, except the son of Antiochus.”

This is, in fact, what happened. The Romans did not apply the three-year period to Antiochus IV but kept him for no less than four three-year periods, or what should have been the entire length of the tribute payments. It would seem that the other hostages did not matter very much, but that the principal hostage would remain in that status.

That Polybius, Livy and Appian are historians associated with Rome does not mean that they are defenders or supporters of what Rome did at the point in history under discussion. Polybius was a Roman hostage himself and a personal enemy of Antiochus IV who explicitly showed his antagonism to the Seleucid king. This might have colored his description of how and why Antiochus IV was sent as a hostage to Rome but in this case it did not. Livy, who saw the perils of hostage taking in the Rome of his time, also did not take any position here. But Appian, at a date further removed from these events, seems more interested in how and when Antiochus IV came to Rome. This may simply be the nature of his concise and summarizing work; Appian, with more of a retrospective vision, only writes about selected historical facts and events. Appian knows that one of the most significant aspects of the Treaty of Apamea will be the emergence of Antiochus IV.

Still, if the consul selected the hostages, as the treaty states according to Appian, this is different from Polybius and Livy who said that Antiochus III must give twenty hostages without any special demands. If we did not have Appian and only had Polybius and Livy, we would not even know at this point in their narratives that Antiochus IV was one of the hostages.

While Appian follows the treaty correctly in reporting that the Roman consul selected the hostages, he seems to say that the Seleucids had control of the process in the exchange of Antiochus IV and Demetrius, that Seleucus willingly gave Demetrius in order to free Antiochus IV, even though he knows that the treaty stipulations point in the opposite direction. I can only speculate why Appian contradicts himself and everything we know, and I base this on Allen’s study of the way various Roman historians speak of hostages. As opposed to the time of Augustus, when Livy speaks of how Rome avoided wars, Appian writes in the time of Trajan and Hadrian, when historians speak openly of Rome’s “stampeding military ambition.” Writing about the aftermath of the Roman victory in the Third Macedonian War, Appian might have wanted

68 In passages discussed above such as Polybius 26.
69 Allen, Hostages and Hostage-Taking, 251.
70 Allen, Hostages and Hostage-Taking, 252.
to emphasize that the seemingly minor clause about hostages in Treaty of Apamea enabled or evolved into a brilliant political strategy that would soon bring Antiochus IV to the throne. The subsequent enactment of this clause some twelve years later, exchanging Antiochus IV for the legitimate heir Demetrius son of Seleucus IV, created two competing Seleucid lines (those of Seleucus IV and Antiochus IV) that would then compete for the crown over the next century, which eventually would lead to nothing less than the destruction of the Seleucid kingdom and the coming of Rome. Seleucus IV would not have cared at all about Antiochus IV and if anything did not want him to return to Antioch as a potential rival; he did not want to “free” him, and certainly not at the expense of Demetrius, his first-born and heir who would soon come of age. So again, why did Appian write about the exchange in this way? I wonder if Appian here does not write with triumphal irony, for the “freeing” of Antiochus IV was the worst possible move for Seleucus IV that would mean his death and the death of his second son Antiochus.

12. The Role of the Attalids

Appian speaks of the important role played by the rulers of Pergamon, Eumenes II and his brother Attalus (II) in Antiochus IV’s accession to the throne. Their participation in the conspiracy is corroborated by OGIS 248, an important Athenian inscription from 175/4, which praises Eumenes II for his help in the rise of Antiochus IV.71 Scholars agree on Eumenes II’s role.72

The Attalid king had good reason to support a rival against Seleucus IV, who, though he had backed down, had prepared for and seriously considered war against Pergamon (Diodorus 29.24). After a grateful Antiochus came to power, as Appian states, his alliance with Pergamon was an important part of his foreign policy.

But this does not contradict the idea that Antiochus IV was established with the support of Rome because Pergamon, despite tensions, was a client state of Rome. Appian’s reference to the tensions between Rome and the Attalids is not overstated, but it is several (perhaps six) years premature. Following Apamea in 188, Eumenes II received major sections of Asia Minor from the Roman victors, as they had no desire to actually administer territory

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72 Green agrees that Eumenes II “almost certainly” was involved in the assassination of Seleucus IV and the rise of Antiochus IV (Green, Alexander to Actium, 429). Gruen calls Eumenes II’s support for Antiochus IV “standard Hellenistic maneuvering” (Gruen, The Hellenistic World, 647).
in the Hellenistic east at this point but wished for a strong Pergamon in Asia Minor as a buffer zone against any possible Seleucid expansion in the future. During the Third Macedonian war (171–68), Pergamon fought for Rome against Perseus and it was only towards the end of the war that the Senate became displeased.73

Again, in 175, Pergamon was eager to be part of a conspiracy formed by its patron Rome that would place an ally on the Seleucid throne.

13. **Antiochus IV and the Three Horns**

Dan 7:8, 20 and 24 seem to provide two conclusions regarding how the three horns were brought down. The first two verses make it seem that the three horns will be “uprooted” to make way for Antiochus IV, the little horn, while v. 24—the most important of the three passages because it explains the meaning of the symbolism—indicates that Antiochus IV himself will bring these three kings low. The maskîlim who wrote the latter chapters of Daniel may have believed that all of the actors who wreaked havoc with the Seleucid succession played their parts in the unfolding of God’s will. Perhaps the meaning of the “uprooting” of the three horns for Antiochus IV is that God’s hand can be seen in the success of the “uprooters,” Rome and Pergamon. God’s power is expressed in the return of a scorned Seleucid prince who had joined his interests with those nations who supported his ascension. While it is difficult to know what these authors knew about the causes of the events of their time, the closer that the historical review comes to the Antiochene persecution, the fuller the exposition and the more accurate the details.74 They may not have known everything that we may know today, but they may have had a strong sense that Antiochus IV was an unusual figure who could manipulate situations, individuals and kingdoms in his rise to the top.

In attempting to identify the three horns of Dan 7, I have tried to make a case for the involvement of Antiochus IV in the displacement of Demetrius and the assassinations of Seleucus IV and his son Antiochus. While Antiochus IV’s responsibility for the murder of the latter is clear, it is much more difficult to prove that he was involved in Rome’s demand for Demetrius or the assassination of his older brother Seleucus IV.

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73 The Romans suspected Eumenes II of conspiring with Perseus of Macedon and consequently in 167, the Romans made an abortive attempt to turn his brother Attalus II against him and refused Eumenes entry into Italy to plead his case. See E. Kosmetatou, “The Attalids of Pergamon,” in A. Erskine (ed.), *A Companion to the Hellenistic World* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2003), 159–74 (164).

The author of Dan 7 would have needed much less convincing. In the midst of the tumultuous events of his time, Antiochus IV’s usurpation of the Seleucid throne would have seemed to be part and parcel of what the Daniel author saw as the unique evil of the eleventh horn. He was the “little horn” who grew up among the other horns and displaced three of them, his brother and two nephews who were the heirs to the throne. Antiochus IV did it, as several passages in the Book of Daniel emphasize, with cunning lies and terrible violence. No wonder that when he turned his attention to the people of Judea, he created a “time of trouble” (Dan 12:1) that seemed to be nothing short of apocalyptic.